Historical revisionism by decree
Russian President Vladimir Putin is rewriting history as he pleases: in the run-up to the anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany, he has once again proclaimed the war against Ukraine to be a continuation of the Soviet Union’s heroic struggle against the Nazis and the West. Researchers of the University of Basel provide an analysis of this strategy.
26 February 2025 | Jonas Frey
In mid-January, Vladimir Putin issued a decree declaring 2025 to be the year of the “Defender of the Fatherland.” This year, 9 May will mark 80 years since the Soviet Army’s victory over Nazi Germany. In his Executive Order, however, Putin linked the celebrations of the 80th anniversary of victory in the “Great Patriotic War” with the “heroic deeds of participants in the special military operation” – that is, in the war against Ukraine. In a report from the Russian TV channel Pervy Kanal, he not only refers to preparations for the anniversary but also emphasizes the protection of “historical truth” – a concept that has been enshrined in the Russian Constitution since 2020.
The TV report includes quotes from other historians and politicians. Among other things, they accuse the Poles of spreading false historical narratives about World War II and of tearing down Soviet monuments. Elsewhere, they claim that the “special operation” in Ukraine serves to fight the same enemy today as 80 years ago: National Socialism. The report ends with images of Nazi symbols in Ukraine.
The war never ended
The Russian Ministry of Culture is currently undertaking a major campaign over the course of several months to mark the 80th anniversary of victory. This campaign’s continual references to the war against Ukraine tie in with the existing “politics of memory” practiced by Putin’s regime. Here, the aim is always to use Russia’s past claims to power in order to derive an inevitability for the present. Particularly on this major anniversary of victory in 1945, the narrative being propagated is therefore that Russia finds itself engaged in a large-scale war with the “collective West”.
“The current narrative in Russia is as follows: the war didn’t end in 1945, and we’re finishing it now; we’re freeing Ukraine from Nazis just as we freed Europe from the Nazis in 1945,” says Professor Benjamin Schenk, professor of Eastern European History at the University of Basel. One of Schenk’s research areas is the politics of memory and imperial nostalgia in Russia.
“For a long time, the slogan ‘Never again’ was prevalent in Russia when it came to remembering the Great Patriotic War,” says Schenk. “Now, this has been almost completely replaced by the slogan ‘We can do it again.’” This, he says, reveals how the memory of Victory Day on 9 May has changed. “The current historical narrative no longer sees the war in a tragic light. It’s no longer predominantly about the victims, but rather about the victors.”
Particularly in East-Central Europe, the Red Army’s victory in World War II was not perceived as a liberation but rather as a new occupation, says Schenk. “People in Poland or the Baltic States see the slogan ‘We can do it again’ as a threat from a Russia that is adopting a neoimperial stance.” The reason for this view can currently be observed on the TV channel Pervy Kanal, which is reporting on the liberation of Polish towns by the Red Army 80 years ago and on alleged revisionist reinterpretation of these events in Poland.
This is consistent with a positive reinterpretation of Stalinism that has taken place under Putin. In schoolbooks, Joseph Stalin is described as an “effective manager” who successfully modernized the country and led it to victory in the war. On the other hand, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is no longer mentioned, as it could cast the “Great Patriotic War” in a negative light and undermine the narrative that Russia is still fighting National Socialism today.
Pompous anniversary celebrations
The mixture of a heroic victory cult and neoimperial claims is particularly evident in Moscow on 9 May every year. Between 1945 and 1989, only four Victory Day parades were held in the Soviet Union. Under Putin, however, this pompous military parade is held on an annual basis.
“Particularly in Stalinism, there was a strong hero narrative. The victory was seen as a result of Stalin’s actions,” says Kira Valter. In her dissertation at the University of Basel, Valter studies Soviet Union’s state culture of remembrance of the war and analyzes speeches given between 1945 and 1987 on the anniversary of the war’s end. These speeches often interpret the victory in World War II as the basis for every future victory. Fundamentally, it was always about the conflict with the West, says Valter.
Schenk says that this is also apparent today when Putin presents the war against Ukraine as a war against NATO: “That frames this war as one in a long series of wars in which Russia responded to Western attacks and won.” If you watch state television all day long and are repeatedly told the story that this is going to happen again, he says, you start to believe it.
